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1.  Introduction
Economists have long recognized the importance  of uncertainty and risk
aversion in the behavior of entrepreneurs.  A  new body of literature  evolved
in the  1970s around the works of Sandmo  [1971]  and Leland  [1972]  and augmented
microeconomics by  introducing the theory of firm decision making under
uncertainty.  The  literature has proliferated substantially since  these early
works, and recent studies incorporate multi product, multi risk and multi
period considerations  (see e.g.,  Hey  [1979],  Just et al.  [1982]  and Newbery
and Stiglitz  [1981]).  Less  attention has been given to the welfare
implications of choices made by risk averse producers.  Only recently have  the
welfare consequences of the Sandmo-Leland framework become the  focus of a
growing literature  (Chavas and Pope  [1981],  Pope et al.  [1983],  Pope  and
Chavas  [1985],  Larson [1988]).  Particular attention has been given to the
extension of welfare measures to  situations  of risk aversion and uncertainty
and to the development of practical means of approximating these measures.
Compensating Variation (CV),  Equivalent Variation  (EV) and Certainty  (money)
Equivalent (CE) have been the three indices  considered for measuring producer
welfare under uncertainty.  (Section 2 provides a brief presentation of  these
indices.)  The main tool used to  approximate these measures has been the
producer surplus  calculated from the ex-ante output supply and input demand
functions.
Pope and Chavas  [1971],  using Willig's  [1976]  approach, show that
producer surplus can be used "without apology" instead of EV and CV.  Larson
[1988]  offers  a procedure,  in the spirit of that suggested by Hausman  [1981],
which evaluates these  indices exactly.  Both approaches rely upon the ex-ante2
output supply and input demand functions.  The evaluation of these  functions
in actual practice  is in many case cumbersome, requiring data which are hard
to  obtain;  thus  applications  rarely are found.
A procedure to  evaluating the producer welfare indices without the need
of the  ex-ante supply and demand functions may therefore be useful.  In this
paper we describe such a procedure.  It relies upon the concept of the
Certainty Equivalent of Price  (CEP) and uses  the purely technological relation
of the marginal cost curve instead of the ex-ante supply function.  By using
CEP, we derive  (in Section 3) the  three welfare indices  as  the profits
(abstracting from fixed costs)  that would prevail under certainty at different
levels  of  the CEP.  The  implications  (discussed in Section 4) include a  unique
framework for estimating welfare changes  in certain cases.  Further remarks
concerning possible use of  the present approach for welfare evaluation in
practice are given in the concluding section.
2.  Welfare Measures
Consider a risk averse supplier of a single product who faces uncertainty
on product price.  The producer maximizes  expected utility, where  the utility
function U(.)  is defined on wealth and satisfies U'>O and U"<O  . Wealth is
composed of initial wealth, Wo,  and the operating profit PY-C(Y;a),  where P is
the output price, Y is output  supplied, C(.)  is the variable cost  function
generated by  some underlying production technology and a is a  parameter vector
characterizing  the production  technology (unless needed explicitly, a will be
suppressed from -the arguments of C).  The uncertainty is  represented by a
(subjective) cumulative distribution function on the  output price.  This
distribution function is assumed to be uniquely defined by  the moments vector
9-(p,a,...),  where  (p,a,...)  represents the mean, standard deviation and3
higher central moments of output price.2
The.firm is  a taker of a price distribution or, alternatively, of a
vector 8.  The ex-ante  supply function, Y(O,Wo),  is  the  supply level  that
maximizes the expected utility E(U(PY-C(Y)+Wo)).  Plugging Y(O,Wo)  into the
maximand yields  the indirect expected utility of profit
V(e,Wo) - E(U(W(,,Wo)+Wo)),  (2.1)
where
W(O,Wo)  - PY(B,Wo)  - C(Y(6,Wo)).  (2.2)
V(O,Wo)  is  a non-monetary measure of  the well-being of a producer endowed
with initial wealth Wo which operates under output price uncertainty
A
characterized by 8.  The  associated monetary measure, indicated by W(6,Wo),  is
the  money income that  leaves  the producer indifferent to receiving it with
A
certainty or having the random income W(P,Wo).  Thus W(6,Wo)  is  the  lowest
certain income  the producer would be willing to receive  instead of the
prevailing uncertain income W(-);  it satisfies
A
U(W(O,Wo)+Wo) - V(B,Wo).  (2.3)
Suppose a change  in the price distribution, indicated by a move  81 -- _  82
occurs.  The resulting change  in producer welfare  is V(2  ,Wo)-V(1  ,Wo).  In
view of the definition of W(.),  an obvious monetary measure  of this welfare
change would be the Certainty (money) Equivalent  (CE) index
A  A
CE - W(8  ,Wo) - W(e  ,Wo).  (2.4)
Two other monetary indices have been considered in the literature;  they are
the  Compensating Variation (CV) and the  Equivalent Variation  (EV) defined
from:
V(O  ,Wo+EV) - V(2 ,Wo),  (2.5)
V(82,Wo-CV) - V(1l,Wo).  (2.6)
Figure  1 provides  a graphical  representation of producer surplus  (S),  CE4
and CV in the p-Y plan, with a and higher moments  of output price held
constant (since CV and EV are parallel concepts, only CV  is considered).  The
curve indicated by Y  is  the  ex-ante supply defined above.  The curve  labeled
Y  is  the  ex-ante supply when the producer's initial wealth is compensated to
keep him or her as well off as under regime  61.  The curve  indicated by Yh  is
A
the derivative of W(-)  with respect  to p  , and lies  to  the right of the
ex-ante supply, provided that decreasing absolute risk aversion prevails  (see
e.g.,  Pope and Chavas  [1985]).  The  three indices  CV, S and CE are  given by
2  1  2  1  2  1
the areas p aep  ,  p bel  and  2  cdl  ,  respectively.  The producer that
generates  the curves depicted in Figure 1 exhibits decreasing absolute risk
aversion with respect to wealth.  Under constant absolute risk aversion, the
three curves  and their  corresponding welfare  indices coincide. 3
Figure 1
3.  Certainty Equivalent Prices and the Three Welfare Indices
The concept of Certainty Equivalent Price  (CEP)  is now used.to derive
alternative representations  of the  three welfare indices.  The underlying idea
is  simple.  Recalling that producer welfare under certainty  (i.e.,  profit) is
measured by  the area to  the  left of the Marginal Cost  (MC) curve and below the
output price, we will show that the  three welfare measures CE,  EV and CV are
obtained as  areas to  the  left of MC and between appropriate CEP levels.
The CEP,  denoted by P(O,Wo),  is  the least certain price that a risk
averse producer, endowed with initial wealth Wo, would be willing to receive
4
instead of the random price distributed according to  8.  Formally, P(6,Wo)
satisfies:
P(6,Wo).Q[P(6,Wo)]  - C(Q[P(,Wo)])  - W(O,Wo),  (3.1)
where Q[.]  is  the supply under certainty determined by equating price to5
marginal cost and W(O,Wo)  is  defined in equation  (2.3).
It follows directly from  (3.1) and  (2.4) that
CE - P(O2,Wo).Q[P(e2,Wo)]  - C(Q[P(Z,Wo)])  -
(P(S  ,Wo)  Q[P(  l,Wo)]  - C(Q[P(s 1 ,Wo)])).  (3.2)
Furthermore, EV and CV can now be  represented in terms  of CEP as:
EV - P(0  ,Wo).Q[(82,Wo)]  - C(Q[p(2,Wo)]) 
(P(6e,Wo+EV).Q[P(s1,Wo+EV)]  - C(Q[P(1  ,Wo+EV)]))  (3.3)
and
CV - P( Z,Wo-CVQWoCV)]  Q  WoCV)])  -
(P(  Wo  )-Q[P(,Wo)]  - C(Q[P(k,Wo)])).  (3.4)
To verify (3.3),  note that the first term on its  right hand side equals
W(8  ,Wo),  which  is  also equal to U'  (V(O2,Wo))-Wo  [cf.  equation (2.3)].  The
second term equals W(O1,Wo+EV)  -'U '(V(81,Wo+EV))-Wo-EV.  But  EV satisfies
V(  l,Wo+EV)-V(s  ,Wo)  [cf.  (2.5)],  which implies  (3.3).  A similar argument can
be  used to verify (3.4).
From  (3.2)-(3.4) it directly follows  that the  three welfare indices  are
obtained as areas  to  the  left of the MC curve and between appropriate CEP
levels:
P( 2 ,Wo)
CE - f Q[x]dx  ,(3.5)
p(e  ,Wo)
P(a  ,Wo)




cv  - f  Q[x]dx  . (3.7)
Pi(,Wo)
To verify (3.5)  note, from  (3.2),  that CE  is  the  difference between the
quasi-rents evaluated at the  CEP levels  P(O2,Wo) and P( 1,Wo).  This6
difference is  merely the  area to the  left of the MC curve between these  two
CEP  levels.  In a similar manner,  (3.6)  and  (3.7)  follow from (3.3)  and  (3.4).
A graphical  illustration is presented in Figure 2.
Figure 2
4.  Implications
Representations  (3.5)-(3.7)  reveal that,  unlike the definitions of EV and
CV, the  CE  concept does not allow for  (hypothetical) income compensations  to
affect decisions  [CE does not enter the  CEP in representation  (3.2)].  The  CE
concept is based on a welfare comparison which views the producer as if he or
she were operating  in a certain world  (i.e.,  the  certainty equivalent world);
under certainty wealth compensations  do not affect supply decisions.  In the
EV and CV concepts, uncertainty is  retained and income compensations are
therefore allowed to  affect decisions.  Evidently, the situation perceived
here  is  where producers operate under  (a changing) uncertainty.  It therefore
appears  that CV and EV are  the appropriate indices  to  use  in the present
context.
Nevertheless  the  CE index is  still useful since  it  satisfies  the welfare
criterion:  regime 82 is preferred or indifferent  to regime  1  if and only if
CE > O.  This property follows directly from the strict monotonicity of U(-)
and equations  (2.3) and  (2.4);  where the  preference relation over  the
uncertain regimes 8 is  represented by the indirect utility function V(-).
Furthermore, the  CE  index bounds the  CV and EV indices  from above  and hence
can serve as an upper bound on welfare changes, thereby justifying its use  as
a quantitative welfare measure.
The  CE index  is easier  to  evaluate  than the  other, variational indices.
This can be seen by noting that the  CE index has  a closed form expression
[equation (3.5)],  whereas  the other two  indices  are given as  the  roots of7
their corresponding equations  [(3.6)  and  (3.7)].  Thus  less  information is
required to obtain the CE index.  All  three require  information on the MC
curve, which  is a technological relationship  independent of risk preferences
and uncertainly.  Evaluating EV and CV requires, in addition, knowledge of the
behavior of the CEP function over an interval  of income compensation levels.
For example,  from representation  (3.6),  the  EV measure associated with a move
8 -4  8  requires  the knowledge of P(2  ,Wo) and of P(01,Wo+EV) for various
levels  of EV.  On the other hand, using (3.5),  the evaluation of CE requires
the  knowledge of just two points of  the CEP function, P( 1 ,Wo) and P(  Wo),
which are evaluated at the uncompensated  initial wealth Wo.  Thus evaluating
CE does not require wealth effect information;  only effects of the price
distribution (8) are needed.  Obviously, it  is  easier to  obtain two  CEP points
evaluated at the actual  initial wealth rather than a continuum of points
defined over an interval of  (hypothetically)  compensated income levels.
Representations  (3.5)-(3.7) also make apparent that, under decreasing
absolute  risk aversion, CE exceeds both CV and EV;  and this relation holds
true  in the general case where the mean and other moments of  the output price
distribution vary.  This  is so  because decreasing absolute risk aversion
implies that the  CEP is  positively related to wealth (as  the  initial wealth
increases producers are less bothered by the uncertainty and will demand a
higher  [certain]  price to  get rid of it).  Assuming with no  loss of generality
that regime  82  is preferred to regime 81,  it  is  clear from Figure  2 that CE
exceeds EV and CV.  Obviously, the  three indices  coincide when no wealth
effects are present, i.e.,  under constant absolute risk aversion  (simply note
that the limits of  integration in  (3.5)-(3.7) are the  same).
Applying  the present approach in practice  requires information on i) the
marginal cost (MC) curve  and ii)  some CEP levels.  The MC curve depends on the8
production technology and can be  evaluated from engineering data.  The  effects
of uncertainty and risk preference are captured by the CEP.  Obtaining the
required CEP information  is more problematic because there exists no market
mechanism through which data on this variable can be observed.  However, in
the generic case where producers can choose the price distribution under which
to  operate,  it  is possible  to use the observable discrete choices of the
uncertain regime  in order  to obtain the  CEP information.  Such  is  the  case,
for instance, when the producer must decide on whether to participate  in an
agricultural commodity program.  A participation decision entails a certain
price distribution (which depends on the program's provisions) whereas  the
decision not to participate entails another  one  (which is  determined by the
market).  Another example  is where a choice must be made on a single product
to produce among several possible products.  The production technologies  are
perfectly known but the  demand for each product is uncertain with uncertainty
that varies across products.
As an illustration, suppose  the welfare consequences of a change  in the
provisions of  an agricultural price stabilization program are sought. Under
the current program the price distribution is  characterized by  the moment
vector  61  and under the new program by 82. Evaluating the  CE index associated
with this  move requires knowledge of P(Oj,Wo),  j-1,2.  Given a form for  the
CEP function and given data on program participation decisions, it  is
described in Appendix B how one  can indirectly estimate the parameters of the
CEP function.  Such an estimate  can then be used to predict  the CEP  level
under  62  and thereby to  evaluate the  CE index, according to equation  (3.5).
Furthermore, given estimates  of the wealth effect in the CEP function, the  CV
and EV  indices can easily be calculated as  the  roots of equations  (3.6) and
(3.7),  respectively.9
5.  Concluding Remarks
Previous methods to  evaluating welfare consequence of changes  in price
uncertainty rely on the ex-ante supply function.  This paper presents an
alternative approach which uses the marginal cost  (MC) function instead, but
requires knowledge  of some levels  of the  certainty equivalent price  (CEP).
The MC function is  a technological relation and can be estimated from
engineering data.  The  effects of uncertainty and risk aversion are captured
by the CEP,  for which no  data are observed.  However, in cases  involving
discrete choices  over uncertain regimes,  it may be possible to  indirectly
extract the required CEP information using the observable discrete choices.
Even when this  indirect approach is not feasible  (perhaps because data on
the  related decisions  are not available),  there  is still another approach, a
direct one,  that is worth considering;  namely, eliciting the required CEP
information via interviews.  In view of the discussion of the previous
section, such a direct approach may in particular be appropriate  (in the  sense
of requiring the least information) when the CE  index is evaluated.
Experimental methods to elicit utility information have a long history in
decision theories  (e.g.,  Becker, DeGroot and Marschak  [1964],  Keene and
Raiffa  [1976]).  A-related literature, dealing with the valuation of public
goods and other extra market benefits, appears under the heading of
"contingent valuation methods"  (Mithchel and Carson [1989]).
If such a direct approach is used to elicit CEP  information, one may
wonder why not to  use the  same approach in order  to extract information on
income compensations and thereby to obtain the EV and CV directly.  True, this
is  also a possibility.  However there  is  a substantial difference between the
two  tasks.  To  understand this difference we must resort  to  the decision10
making process outlined in Section 2.  Suppose an agent  is asked to reveal the
least certain price he or  she would be willing to receive  instead of the
prevailing random price.  Equipped with a knowledge of the  level of V(O,Wo)
[cf.  equation  (2.1)]  and of the production technology as  summarized by MC,
the producer must compare profits under different (certain)  price levels and
to  choose  that price level  (or  its associated profit) which under certainty
would yield the same  level of "well being" as  that represented by V(-).
Notice  that in this scenario no income  compensation takes  place and
comparisons of certainty world profits  are performed.
Now suppose  the  same agent  is  asked to  reveal the  lowest  income
compensation he or  she would be willing to receive in order to accept  the move
1  2
B -*  2.  To  derive this  information the  agent must make comparisons  involving
the  ex-ante supply function at various  income compensation levels  [cf.
equations  (2.1),  (2.2) and  (2.5)].  Such uncertainty world calculations are
clearly of different nature than those performed in the previous case.  Thus
the  two tasks  are different and whether either can be implemented successfully
is yet an open question which must be determined empirically.11
Appendix  A.  Uncertain  Input  Prices
Suppose  output  and  input  prices  are  uncertain.  Let  q-(p,r)  be  the  l+k
vector  of  random  output  and  input  prices  whose  distribution  is  characterized
by  the  moment  vector  8.  Let  x(O,Wo)  be  the  k  by  1  vector  of  ex-ante  input
demand  functions  defined  from  Max  E(U(py(x)-r-x+Wo)),  where  the  expectation  is
X
taken  with  respect  to  the  joint  distribution  of  all  prices  and  y(x)  is  the
production  function.  The  indirect  utility  of  profit  is  defined,  analogously
to  equation  (2.1),  as  V(O,Wo)  - E(U(py(x(6,Wo))-r-x(O,Wo)+Wo))  and  the
certainty  equivalent  income  W(0,Wo)  is  as  defined  in  equation  (2.3).  Given
V(.)  and  W(-),  the  three  welfare  indices  are  as  defined  in  equations
(2.4)-(2.6).
Let  the  k  functions  x[.]  represent  the  input  demand  under  certainty.
That  is,  for  any  given  price  vector,  say  qo  - (po,ro),  x[qo]  satisfies
Dy(x[qo])-ro/po,  where  Dy(.)  is  the  vector  of  the  first  derivatives  of  y.  The
certainty  equivalent  price  vector  q  - (p(O,Wo),r(&,Wo))  can  now  be  defined  as
the  solution  to  the  k+l equations:
py(x[q])  - rx[q]  +  Wo  - W
Dy(x[q])  - r/p 
Suppose a change  in the uncertainty, indicated by a move  61 - 8 ,  occurs.
Let q(Oj,Z) - (p(8i,Z),r(^JZ)) be the CEP under regime  8j, j-1,2, with Z
indicating the compensated initial wealth.  Let QR(q) - py(x[q])  - r-x[q]
represent the quasi-rent under certainty associated with the  (certain) price
vector q. Then, using the derivation of Section 3, it  is straightforward to
verify that:
2  1
CE  - QR(q(62,Wo))  - QR(q(O ,Wo)),
EV - QR(q(82,Wo))  - QR(q(  1,Wo+EV)),
CV  - QR(q(  2,Wo-CV))  - QR(q(51,Wo)).12
Consider  the special case where only one price  is uncertain, say  that of
the  first input, with the output price and the  rest of the  input prices  given
at a known level.  Using Hotelling's lemma it can be verified that the  three
welfare indices  are obtained as  areas  to  the  left of the first  input demand
function and between appropriate  levels of the  first input CEP:
r  l( 2 ,  1 Wo)  r  2,Wo)  (  ,Wo-CV)
CE - f  xl[s]ds,  EV - f  xl[s]ds  and CV - f  xl[s]ds  ,
r l (O8,Wo)  r l(81,Wo+EV)  rl(1  ,Wo)
where xl[s]  is  the demand for the  first input as  a function of the  first
input's price, s, given that all  other prices are at their fixed known level.
Appendix B.  Estimating the Certainty Equivalent Price Function From
Observable Data:  The  Case of Commodity Program Participation
It  is  assumed that the form of the  CEP function P(-)  is known.  This can
be  achieved directly by specifying the utility function and the output price
distribution and proceeding along the definitions  of W(-)  and P(-)  [cf.
A
equations  (2.3)  and  (3.1)],  or  indirectly by specifying a form of P(.)  which
is consistent with some underlying utility function and output price
distribution.  The CEP  P(-)  depends on  its arguments,  8 and Wo, via a set of
unknown parameters 6.  We seek to  estimate p.  If observations on P(-)  were
available and given data on 8 and Wo,  one could proceed in an obvious manner
to estimate P.  Unfortunately, data on P(.)  from observable actions  are not
available.
Suppose  the production  technology is known a priori  (or can be estimated
from engineering data) so that the cost  function C(-)  and the inverse marginal
cost  function Q[.]  are  given.  Thus  the  certainty equivalent income function
W(s,Wo;3) - P(e,Wo;f)Q[P(6,Wo;P)]  - C(Q[P(9,Wo;B)])
[cf.  equation  (3.1)]  is known up  to  the parameter vector  3.13
A decision to  participate in a commodity program entails a binary choice
between two uncertain regimes 9° and  81,  where  90  and 81  characterize the
output price distribution for non-participants  and participants, respectively.
Regime 1 (0) is chosen if V(81,Wo) >  (<)  V(8°,Wo) or equivalently, using
equation  (2.3),  if W(81,Wo) > (S)  W(O°,Wo).  Taking account of measurement
(and possibly of specification) errors and letting v represent these errors,
the discrete choice problem can be  formulated in terms  of a non-linear
discrete  choice model as:
1  if W(8,Wo;P) - W(°,Wo;9) + v > 0
d  - x
otherwise
Given data on participation decisions  (d),  on the output price distributions
(89  and  0°),  on wealth (Wo) and possibly on other socioeconomic attributes of
growers, one can use this model to  estimate  the parameter vector A  up to  a
normalization with respect  to  the variance of  the error  term v.14
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Footnotes
1This  simple  case  is considered for the  sake of presentation clarity.  The
analysis extends  to  cases  involving also  input price uncertainty.  In Appendix
A the general case  is  outlined.
2The  condition for the moments of a random variable to define  a unique
distribution function can be  found in Rao  (1965, p. 86).
It  is  obvious  that in the absence of wealth effect,  i.e.,  under constant
absolute  risk aversion, Y - Y(B,Wo).  To  see  that Yh- Y(O,Wo)  in this  case,
note that Y(O,Wo)  is  the supply level that maximizes E(U(PY-C(Y)+Wo))  and
satisfies  the  first order  condition:  E(U'(W(O,Wo)).[P-C'(Y(B,Wo))])  - 0. By
differentiating equations  (2.2) and  (2.3) with respect  to y  and using the
above  condition, we obtain 8W(8,Wo)/ap - Y(O,Wo)-H(O,Wo) - Yh, where H(B,Wo)  -
A
E(U'(W(6,Wo)))/U'(W(6,Wo)).  Now constant absolute  risk aversion  implies
-AW exponential utility. Without loss of generality, let U(W) - l-e  ,  A being
the  absolute risk coefficient, and define M as  the moment generating function
of W (assumed to exists).  Thus E(U(W))  - 1-M(-A).  From U(W) - E(U(W))  it
AAW follows  that W - -log(M(-A))/A. Likewise E(U'(W))-AE(e  ) - A.M(-A),  and
A
A  -AW
U'(W) - A-e  -A-M(-A). Recalling the definition of H above, we obtain H(.)-l.
4Newbery and Stiglitz  (1981, p. 59)  denote this price  the utility certainty
equivalent price, as  opposed to the action certainty equivalent price.  The
latter is  the price that under certainty would result in the supply level
being equal  to  the ex-ante  supply Y(8,Wo).
A similar conclusion was drawn in the  related context of evaluating consumer
surplus under price uncertainty  (see Choi and Johnson)FIGURE  1
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